ROUDAUT Gwenael

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This paper examines the relationships between independence, director unobservable ability and firm performance. We develop an original empirical strategy based on the AKM model to estimate separately director fixed effects (as a measure of individual ability) and firm fixed effects. We show that board independence has an ambiguous impact on corporate performance because of two opposing forces: one related to the director nomination process, the other one related to board functioning. On one hand, we report that independence is positively correlated with individual fixed effects, an evidence consistent with a nomination process of independent directors based on individual ability. On the other hand, and regarding board functioning, we show that independence, netted out individual ability, is negatively correlated with firm performance suggesting that independent board members experience an informational deficit (as compared to affiliated directors).

Using multi-source extra-financial rating datasets (Vigéo and Asset4), this paper empirically investigates the relationships between CSR commitment (social, environment and societal) and board composition for French listed firms (SBF120) over the 2006-2011 period. This paper tests the two main hypotheses regarding CSR commitment from the corporate governance perspective: CEO's oppor-tunistic behavior and stakeholder conflict resolution, and compares both shareholder and stakeholder board perspectives. We show that CSR commitment, except environment one, is driven by good corporate governance practices from the shareholder perspective (high independence and low share of insiders). From the stakeholder perspective, social commitment is positively associated with stake-holders' representation inside the boardroom and societal one is positively related to supply-chain stakeholders' representation. These results support the stakeholder conflict resolution hypothesis (value-enhancing view). However, the results are mixed for environmental CSR dimension, suggesting that environmental commitment reduces conflicts with employees but exacerbates them with other stakeholders.

– This paper examines the evolution of within-board gender inequality following the adoption of a board-level gender quota for French listed companies in 2011. We show that the quota has succeeded in opening the doors of boardrooms to new, unseasoned women, who present distinctive characteristics. However, conditional on these characteristics, we provide evidence that female new comers are less likely that their male counterparts (both seasoned and new comers) to hold key positions within boards (namely, audit, compensation and nominating committee membership and chairing). This positional segregation is the main driver of a within-firm gender fees gap that amounts to 5.

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The process of creating economic value is based on a territorial heritage made up of ecological, technical and social functions that articulate the elements of the productive capital and ensure its perennial availability. The added value is a monetary representation of its effects on the individual activity of the entities of the territory. However, this heritage is a common good. The Economy of Functionality model integrates the maintenance of this asset from the cooperative design of "product-services" solutions contracted between entities in the territory. The study of the Ile-de-France energy renovation of private tertiary buildings and the supply of construction aggregates reveals the interest of their integrated governance at the regional level. The availability of the information necessary for the emergence of these representations and scenarios is desirable at each scale of evaluation, throughout the process of deliberation, contractualization and valorization. Its quality conditions economic innovation for a more sustainable territorial development. The systems and practices associated with its management therefore have a heritage and productive value.

This article studies the relationship between board independence and firm operating performance in French listed companies. We take advantage of an original database, with a time-series dimension that can be used to mitigate heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity issues. In addition, this database can be disaggregated at the individual (director) level. This design enables us to introduce firm fixed effects and individual fixed effects in firm performance equations, thereby controlling for heterogeneity at the firm and individual levels. Our main result is to document a significant negative relationship between independence and accounting performance. This result suggests that, in the French context, the costs of independence (i.e. the informational gap supported by independent directors compared to insiders and affiliated directors) outweigh the benefits of independence (i.e. the reduction in agency costs).

While often criticized, independence remains the ultimate criterion for evaluating board composition, whether for regulators or shareholder activists. In this study, we examine the relationship between board independence and firm operating performance in a panel of French listed companies, paying particular attention to heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns. We take advantage of an original database, with a time-series dimension that can be used to mitigate heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity issues through GMM estimators. In addition, this database can be disaggregated at the individual (director) level. This design enables us to introduce firm fixed effects and individual fixed effects in (firm) performance equations, thereby controlling for heterogeneity at the firm and individual levels. To our knowledge, this is the first paper so far to provide a systematic account on this issue for France. Our main result is to document a significant negative relationship between accounting performance and the independence status (irrespective of the person). This result supports the argument of an information gap suffered by independent board members, as developed by Adams and Ferreira (2007).

This paper examines whether women’s situation within French boards has improved following the adoption of a board-level gender quota in 2011. To do so, we focus on the individual role of female directors as proxied by their fees. Our sample includes the listed companies belonging to the SBF120 index over the 2006-2014 period. We first show that the quota has succeeded in opening the doors of boardrooms to new, unseasoned female directors (not present on the director labor market before the regulation). These unseasoned female directors have distinctive characteristics (in terms of independence, experience, age, nationality, etc.) as compared to other board members. More importantly, we show that women, whether unseasoned or seasoned, experience an inner glass ceiling, with “positional” gender segregation within French boards. In particular, companies have failed so far to open the access of the most important board committees (namely monitoring committees: audit, compensation and nomination) to women. It results in a within-firm gender fees gap of 5%. Overall, the quota has rather amplified this segregation process, with an increase in the average within-firm gender fees gap.

In order to achieve a sustainable growth and to respond to external pressures (regulation, society), firms take more and more frequently into account their social and environmental externalities in the decision-making process, through the development of their Corporate Social Responsibility policy (CSR). Corporate governance appears here as a way to integrate shareholders’ and stakeholders’ objectives. Is corporate governance a strategic mediator between CSR objectives and firm performance? Is corporate governance a key stone of CSR firm commitment? This dissertation provides both theoretical and empirical evidences in the French case where corporate governance is defined as a hybrid model between the shareholder and stakeholder models. After introducing the dissertation, chapters 2 and 3 investigate the link between firm objectives and performance. From an INSEE national survey on sustainable development, Chapter 2 shows how firm motivations (defensive, pro-social or strategic) is a key determinant of their social, societal and environmental CSR awareness. In particular, firms implementing strategic CSR commit more to the issues related to their strategic stakeholders. CSR motivations may therefore mediate the relationship between CSR commitment and financial performance. Integrating firm objectives, the decision-making process at the top is driven by the board of directors. Chapter 3 theoretically demonstrates how board composition may affect firm outcomes. In particular, the model determines the optimal board functioning (monitoring or advising) depending on the relative cost and benefit of board expertise and independence. After highlighting that board composition is a key determinant of governance effectiveness, the three last chapters explore how corporate governance, and in particular board composition, may achieve some CSR demands from shareholders, stakeholders and society and affect firm outcomes. These chapters rely on empirical studies based on listed companies (SBF120) over the 2006-2014 period. Chapter 4 studies the link between independent directors and operating performance in order to evaluate their efficiency. The independence of directors is indeed usually considered as an answer to shareholders’ demands to reduce the conflict of interest with management. We show that in France, independents directors are better selected than affiliated directors in terms of intrinsic ability but suffer from an informational gap. However, this gap may be shortened by industry expertise and/or social connections. Chapter 5 investigates from the shareholder and stakeholder perspectives how board composition is related to CSR commitment. We show that CSR engagement is driven by the reduction of conflicts with stakeholders rather than the creation of private benefit for managers. Stakeholder representation inside the boardroom may therefore affect investment in the different CSR issues. Chapter 6 analyzes how firms comply with the French gender quota of women inside the boardroom in 2014. The quota has indeed broken the glass-ceiling experienced by female managers and increased the number of women in the director labor market. However, female directors earn 6% less in fees than their male counterparts, one third due to their characteristics (age, expertise, tenure.) and two thirds due to their positions (committees) inside the boardroom. Female directors have then experienced an inner glass-ceiling which may jeopardize the positive expected effects of board diversity on firm policy and performances. In conclusion, the discussion provides the main new prospects and research avenues opened up by this dissertation. It focuses attention on the role of corporate governance in the development of CSR and the possible applications in terms of public policy and regulation.

While often criticized, independence remains the ultimate criterion for evaluating board composition, whether for regulators or shareholder activists. In this study, we examine the relationship between board independence and firm operating performance in a panel of French listed companies, paying particular attention to heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns. We take advantage of an original database, with a time-series dimension that can be used to mitigate heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity issues through GMM estimators. In addition, this database can be disaggregated at the individual (director) level. This design enables us to introduce firm fixed effects and individual fixed effects in (firm) performance equations, thereby controlling for heterogeneity at the firm and individual levels. To our knowledge, this is the first paper so far to provide a systematic account on this issue for France. Our main result is to document a significant negative relationship between accounting performance and the independence status (irrespective of the person). This result supports the argument of an information gap suffered by independent board members, as developed by Adams and Ferreira (2007).

This paper develops a two-way director-firm fixed effect model to study the relationship between independent directors’ individual heterogeneity and firm operating performance, using French data. This strategy allows considering and differentiating in a unified empirical framework mechanisms related to board functioning and mechanisms related to director selection. We first show that the independence status, netted out unobservable individual heterogeneity, is negatively related to performance. This result suggests that independent board members experience a strong informational gap that outweighs other monitoring benefits. However, we show that industry-specific expertise as well as informal connections inside the boardroom may help to bridge this gap. Second, we provide evidence that independent directors have higher intrinsic ability as compared to affiliated board members, consistent with a reputation-based selection process.

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