Intervenant: Simon Finster, Postdoctorant au CREST (ENSAE et Institut Polytechnique de Paris) dans le groupe FairPlay d’Inria.

Titre: Equitable Auctions

Présentation en anglais.

Résumé: We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is efficient, Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible, and achieves surplus parity among winners ex-post. The uniform-price auction is equity-optimal if and only if buyers have a pure common value. Against intuition, the pay-as-bid auction is not always preferred in terms of equity if buyers have pure private values. In auctions with price mixing between pay-as-bid and uniform prices, we provide prior-free bounds on the equity-preferred pricing rule under a common regularity condition on signals.

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Organisateur

  • Chaire Economie du Climat

Lieu

Chaire Economie du Climat Palais Brongniart - 28 Place de la Bourse 4eme étage, Paris, Paris 75002 France