Liberal security? Federalism and pension policy in the United States.

Summary This political sociology thesis traces the history of the federal old-age insurance program from its inception in 1935 to the contemporary debate over its future. Through a systematic analysis of the legislative history of this program, it seeks to explain its exceptional destiny within the framework of American social federalism. Divided into five chapters, this work explores the three main moments in the history of the federal old-age insurance system: its establishment during the New Deal (chapters ii and iii), its gradual expansion in the post-war period (chapter iv) and, finally, its reappraisal since the late 1970s (chapter v). In order to place this history in its institutional and socio-political context, the first chapter proposes a historical introduction to the problem of pensions. Theoretically, this work is articulated around a critique of neo-institutionalism, a theoretical approach popularized, among others, by Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol. While doing justice to the structuring influence of political institutions, the method employed also takes into account the role of societal ideas and paradigms in the elaboration and transformation of social policies. Moreover, a close look at the evolution of the system of action of pension policy allows us to invalidate the theory of bureaucratic hegemony (Cates, Derthick, Weaver), which presents the federal experts as the main architects of this policy that developed after 1935.