Labor market matches and wages: some interactions.

Summary The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the analysis of the interactions between job and worker flows on the one hand, and some of the institutions that influence wage formation and labor market adjustments on the other. First, the methodological framework of the research models in which this work is embedded is recalled, and the influence of the wage formation model on the role of institutional factors is illustrated. The analytical portfolio thus identified is then illuminated by a description of the institutions of the labor market that questions the mode of formation favored in these models - bilateral bargaining - and reveals the importance of system effects. We then explore the consequences of an alternative hypothesis - the wage supply - in the joint analysis of the minimum wage, employment protection and the use of temporary forms of employment. This analysis reveals the ambiguity of the impact of certain institutional factors on the unemployment rate. First, when there is monopsony competition between firms, the influence of the minimum wage is more ambivalent than when wages are negotiated bilaterally. Second, as in bargaining models, while transfers in the case of layoffs have no influence on the flow of jobs and workers, other employment protection measures have an undetermined impact on the unemployment rate. Third, in this framework, the use of fixed-term contracts also has an ambiguous influence on labor market performance and, moreover, poses the problem of consistency with other employment policies.