Essays in negotiation theory and governance.

Summary This thesis focuses on the effects that information has on incentives. The three papers provide and explore results when information is the main variable of interest, is endogenous, not homogeneous across actors, and evolves over time in a way that is not necessarily rational. The first paper studies hold-up problems in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection showing that as workers' bargaining power increases, the distortions arising from information asymmetry disappear. In addition, he studies the effect of education and the degree of heterogeneity of the worker population on the distribution of bargaining power in regulated markets. The second paper relaxes the homogeneous belief assumption in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In evolutionary learning that is imitative, principals may have different beliefs about the distribution of agent types in the population. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the polarization in beliefs. Furthermore, the model is a version of a stable cobweb. Our approach offre explanations for the alternating periods with oscillating and relatively stable quantity. The third paper studies the fac¸on in which the informational content of legal policies, such as strict liability and negligence, in case of moral concerns, influence the optimal design of liability regimes. Several recent cases have shown that an individual who has caused harm exposes himself not only to a legal sanction - for example, a fine - but also to social boycott, disapproval, or stigmatization. The article shows that the choice of a strategy depends in a complex way on the importance of the damage and the "moral cost".