DESRIEUX Claudine

This article proposes a first quantitative analysis of the introduction of the scale for unfair dismissal indemnities in France, following the ordinances of autumn 2017. Using an original database, we analyze the discrepancies between the indemnities actually received for cases decided between 2013 and 2017 and the amounts provided by the scale. Seniority appears to be a key criterion for identifying parties sensitive to the scale: employees with low seniority were more likely to receive compensation outside the scale. However, possible indirect effects of the scale are to be considered, such as the multiplication of the number of other heads of claim or their amounts.

This research was conducted by a team federating the skills of economists, jurists and legal practitioners, in response to a call for projects launched in early 2016 by the Mission Recherche Droit et Justice. Supported by two economics laboratories (BETA and CRED), this research focuses on the capacity of a scale to treat equally litigants placed in similar conditions. This question is treated according to three complementary approaches. The first proposes a prospective analysis of the scale, based on a review of the legal economics literature on scales. This literature, which is essentially empirical and focuses on the American case, is rather critical of the ability of scales to achieve their objectives. They would not automatically guarantee greater horizontal equity . they would not necessarily encourage agreements between the parties . they would not guarantee greater severity of sanctions. One of the reasons given is that, when faced with scales, actors, and judges in particular, may develop different attitudes. The second part proposes an empirical analysis ex ante of the introduction of a scale, taking the case of industrial tribunal compensation and using judgments from the Paris Industrial Tribunal prior to the introduction of the mandatory scale in 2017. This descriptive statistical work shows that the amounts obtained are mainly correlated to the section, age and presence of a lawyer (but not to gender). It also examines the effects of a "dummy" application of the 2017 scale. The third part proposes an empirical ex-post analysis of the introduction of a scale, taking the case of the contribution to the maintenance and education of children (CEEE), the determination of which has been governed since the 2010 circular by an indicative scale. Based on the use of six different sources (experimental survey, qualitative survey of judges and four databases of court decisions before and after the scale) and using different econometric methodologies, this section shows that the effect of the scale on the amount of child support and education is not as great as it might seem, This section shows that the homogenization effect attributed to the use of the scale is fairly systematically associated with cases characterized by a pair of divergent parental proposals in terms of CEEE, by a pair of unequal parental incomes in favor of the mother, by a pair of close parental incomes at an intermediate level, or by a pair of consensual and weak parental proposals. On the other hand, the scale would appear to promote disparate outcomes in cases characterized by a zero CSEA offer or in cases characterized by an unequal income couple in favor of the father.

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In this paper, we assess the beliefs of aspiring top civil servants towards the private sector. We use a survey conducted in a French university known for training most of the future high-ranking civil servants and politicians, as well as students who will work in the private sector. Our results show that students aspiring to work in the public sector are more likely to distrust the private sector, to believe that conducting business is easy, and are less likely to see the benefits of public-private partnerships. They are also more likely to believe that private sector workers are self-interested. These results have strong implications for the level of regulation in France, and the cooperation between the public and private sector.

Using a database on French labor courts between 1998 and 2012, we investigate case selection and judicial decision-making. In France, judges are elected at the labor court level on lists proposed by unions, and litigants can first try to settle their case before the judicial hearing. We show that the ideological composition of the court indirectly impacts the settlement behavior of the parties but has no influence on the decision made in court. In addition, parties have self-fulfilling behavior and adapt to institutional rules. When they anticipate long judicial procedures at court, they settle more frequently and only require judicial hearings for complex cases. The duration to decide these complex cases is longer, explaining why they observe (and build their anticipation on) long case duration. Our empirical strategy uses probit, ordered probit and triprobit estimations to control for case selection. JEL codes: K31, K41.

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In 2008, the French government enacted a reform that reduced the number of labor courts by one quarter. This led to significant changes in access to labor courts for many workers and employers who had to travel further to proceed with conflict litigation. We use this reform to evaluate how access to labor courts affects the labor market. Our empirical approach mainly relies on regression-adjusted conditional differences-indifferences estimations. We find that cities that experienced an increase in the distance to their associated labor court suffered from a lower growth rate of job creation (-4 percentage points), job destruction (-4.6 pp) and firm creation (-6.3 pp) between 2007 and 2012 compared to unaffected cities. We find opposite but insignificant effects for cities that experienced a fall in the distance to the labor court. These results emphasize the central role of labor courts for the good functioning of the labor market.

One of the peculiarities of the airline market is the wide divergence in ticket prices for the same flights. This mainly reflects the inability of companies to easily change production volumes and/or stock them. The development and use of yield management models have focused on airlines offering different types of fares for the same flight. The objective of this thesis is to build a number of economic models to explain price dispersion in the airline market from different perspectives. In Chapter 3, I create a direct price model that explains how different product and consumer characteristics influence the price level. Chapter 4 focuses on price level differences from a competitive perspective. In a strategic game where firms compete with each other, ! In a strategic game where firms compete, the set of rationalizable strategies for each player implies all the best responses to each other's decisions. This chapter provides an empirical test for the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly. In Chapter 5, I treat the air passenger market as a product-differentiating market and apply a multinomial logit model to calculate price elasticities. The logit model (with particular emphasis on consumer heterogeneity) estimates how different product characteristics influence market shares.

Industrial tribunals have long been the subject of much debate and controversy, but they are nevertheless a key element of effective employment protection legislation. However, few research works in economics have analyzed this institution. Starting from this observation, the objective of this article is to propose a synthesis of the functioning of industrial tribunals, based on quantitative data. We are interested here in the industrial tribunal procedure, i.e. the rules of operation of the industrial tribunals, and not in the content of the legal rules. This synthesis will be guided by the following questions: Why reform industrial tribunals? How to reform them? To answer these questions, we gather in this article essentially quantitative elements on industrial tribunals. We rely on data provided by the Ministry of Justice from 2004 to 2015. We first present the difficulties that industrial tribunals face and that call for reforming this institution. We then use the tools of legal economic analysis to analyze the recent reforms of this institution, as well as some future avenues for reform. Finally, we discuss in conclusion the stakes, the difficulties and the perspectives of research on this theme.

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This thesis proposes a theoretical and empirical study of the determinants of utility pricing and their efficiency conditions. The consideration of environmental and social issues, the deployment of smart grids and the strong constraint of cost control have led to the implementation of new pricing and organizational practices in public services. This thesis proposes three essays devoted to the impact of these new practices in the French drinking water sector. First, we analyze the impact of the transition from a refined to a progressive tariff on the behavior of drinking water consumers, based on a natural experiment conducted in Dunkirk. A first result indicates that the demand decreased with this new tariff, while creating distortions. A second result indicates that the reaction of consumers to the price signal was ambivalent. This work suggests that we should rethink the design of the tariffs and the support of consumers in their choices to limit cognitive biases. Second, we analyze how the local political organization (in France, the level of the commune, the syndicate of communes or the inter-communal level) and the management mode (public or private) can influence the performance of the public service. The impact of these organizational configurations on costs has never been studied simultaneously in the literature. We propose a theoretical model, validated by an empirical study based on a panel of French water utilities, which highlights the impact of these different organizational configurations on the price.

The work presented in this thesis focuses on the individual returns to education and training, and seeks to identify more effective ways in which public intervention can increase these returns. The first two chapters of this work explore how returns to individual investments in education can be maximized by improving the efficiency of education and vocational training systems. The final study examines the links between human capital investment and the legal or economic environment that frames it. The first article of this thesis focuses on the effect of enrollment in a French private school in CP and CE1 on academic performance in CE2. The second chapter aims to measure the effectiveness of certification training for French job seekers on their return to employment. The last study shows the link between the flexibilization of the English labor market and access to training for employees. The analyses carried out are based on microeconometric methods which aim to identify the causal effect of the public policies studied. We thus use the instrumental variables method and the difference-in-differences method. This thesis also relies on the estimation of duration models, using the timing-of-events method or estimating a bivariate competing risks model.

The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of industrial tribunal proceedings is often pointed out as a possible obstacle to hiring. This uncertainty is partly generated by the fact that similar cases brought before the industrial tribunal are judged very differently from one case to another, or from one jurisdiction to another. After recalling the historical objective of the industrial tribunal system, its mode of operation and its recent developments, this note shows that the decisions rendered by the industrial tribunals do indeed vary greatly from one jurisdiction to another. The source of this variability remains uncertain: it may reflect the arbitrary nature of industrial tribunal justice as much as the fact that the cases judged by the different jurisdictions are of a different nature and gravity. Finally, this paper draws on the work of Desrieux and Espinosa to show that the union membership of judges elected by employees does not influence the decisions rendered by the industrial tribunals. This result makes it possible to rule out a possible source of bias in the justice rendered by the various industrial tribunals.

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The uncertainty about the outcomes of proceedings before France’s employment tribunals (“les conseils de prud’hommes”, also known as “les prud’hommes”) is often pointed to as a possible damper on hiring of new staff. This uncertainty would appear to be generated in part by the fact that similar cases brought before them seem to be judged differently from one time to another or from one tribunal to another. After recalling the historic aim of the “institution prud’homale”, the way it works, and recent changes to it, this policy brief shows that the decisions rendered by the French employment tribunals do indeed vary strongly from one tribunal to another. However, the source of this variability remains in doubt: it might equally well reflect the arbitrary nature of “prud’homale” justice as the fact that the cases judged by the various tribunals are of different natures and of different seriousness. Finally, this policy brief uses the work of Desrieux and Espinosa to show that union membership of the judges elected by employees does not influence the decisions rendered by the French employment tribunals. These findings make it possible to dismiss a possible source of partiality in the justice rendered by the various tribunals.

The uncertainty about the outcomes of proceedings before France’s employment tribunals (“les conseils de prud’hommes”, also known as “les prud’hommes”) is often pointed to as a possible damper on hiring of new staff. This uncertainty would appear to be generated in part by the fact that similar cases brought before them seem to be judged differently from one time to another or from one tribunal to another. After recalling the historic aim of the “institution prud’homale”, the way it works, and recent changes to it, this policy brief shows that the decisions rendered by the French employment tribunals do indeed vary strongly from one tribunal to another. However, the source of this variability remains in doubt: it might equally well reflect the arbitrary nature of “prud’homale” justice as the fact that the cases judged by the various tribunals are of different natures and of different seriousness. Finally, this policy brief uses the work of Desrieux and Espinosa to show that union membership of the judges elected by employees does not influence the decisions rendered by the French employment tribunals. These findings make it possible to dismiss a possible source of partiality in the justice rendered by the various tribunals.

A solution to the problem of underdevelopment has appeared in the international transfer of technology, which combines assistance, training, cooperation, and sometimes financial aid. In view of the interest of this process, the United Nations began a process of legislation. One still remembers the "International Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer", which appeared to be a major step forward for developing countries in economic progress. Despite the failure of this attempt, the process has remained at the heart of international exchanges, with technology imposing itself as the instrument for measuring development. This is why the least developed countries are engaged in a real race for technology, as a guarantee of their right to development. This has led to the evolution of legal mechanisms for transfers, which are themselves now linked to the technologies transferred. On the international scene, we are therefore witnessing a series of laws relating to technology transfer and intellectual property, which not only demonstrate the legal security of transactions, but also the new vision of economic relations, notably that of taking into account the effects of technology on the environment. With an existing but not repressive intellectual property law, Sub-Saharan African countries are particularly trying to obtain their development through investments. To this end, they are creating favorable regulatory frameworks. International partnership, private and public investment, patents,... all these means of access to technology deserve to be examined in depth.This thesis is written with the objective of comparing and promoting a technology acquisition adapted for developing countries, but also to promote the implantation of foreign companies in these countries.

This thesis focuses on the effects that information has on incentives. The three papers provide and explore results when information is the main variable of interest, is endogenous, not homogeneous across actors, and evolves over time in a way that is not necessarily rational. The first paper studies hold-up problems in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection showing that as workers' bargaining power increases, the distortions arising from information asymmetry disappear. In addition, he studies the effect of education and the degree of heterogeneity of the worker population on the distribution of bargaining power in regulated markets. The second paper relaxes the homogeneous belief assumption in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. In evolutionary learning that is imitative, principals may have different beliefs about the distribution of agent types in the population. Convergence to a uniform belief depends on the relative size of the polarization in beliefs. Furthermore, the model is a version of a stable cobweb. Our approach offre explanations for the alternating periods with oscillating and relatively stable quantity. The third paper studies the fac¸on in which the informational content of legal policies, such as strict liability and negligence, in case of moral concerns, influence the optimal design of liability regimes. Several recent cases have shown that an individual who has caused harm exposes himself not only to a legal sanction - for example, a fine - but also to social boycott, disapproval, or stigmatization. The article shows that the choice of a strategy depends in a complex way on the importance of the damage and the "moral cost".

The need to provide a high-quality justice at reasonable cost represents a current challenge for many public authorities. Many reform projects propose to remove some courts in order to rationalize the judiciary. This paper explores the 2008 French reform of labor courts (removing 20% of the courts) to empirically investigate the determinants of the removal decision, and its consequences on caseload and case duration in the remaining courts. This represents -to our knowledge- the first attempt to evaluate the impacts of courts’ removal. Using panel data, our empirical strategy is based on probit estimations, counterfactuals, as well as 3SLS estimations. Our results show that the reform targeted small and concentrated courts. At the aggregated national level, it appears that duration did not increase, but the demand for litigation decreased. Locally, we find that courts were affected in different ways according to the relative burden they took on.

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This paper empirically investigates the interaction between repeated transactions and endogenous contractual incompleteness. We design an indefinitely repeated games experiment between identifiable players. In this experiment, the probability of continuation and the level of shared information vary over the treatments. The level of contractual completeness is decided by participants at each period. Our results show that past interactions are a stronger determinant of the level of investment in contractual completeness than the perspective of future business.

Unique in the French jurisdictional landscape, the industrial tribunals settle disputes related to employment contracts between employers and employees. Justice is dispensed by labor court advisors, proposed by trade unions and elected at the level of each jurisdiction by employees and employers according to a principle of parity. The union composition of each council therefore varies from one jurisdiction to another. The following article looks at the influence of the union composition of the boards on the strategies of the parties and the outcome of litigation. The results are commented by Florence Audier, economist.

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French municipalities often contract out the provision of local public services to private companies, and regularly choose the same private operator for a range of different services. We develop a model of relational contracts that shows how this strategy may lead to better performance at lower cost for public authorities. We test the implication of our model using an original database of the contractual choices made by 5000 French local public authorities in the years 2001, 2004 and 2008.

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