GINGLINGER Edith

Climate risks, whether physical risks or transition risks, represent an increasingly important issue for companies, bankers and institutional investors. This article provides a review of the recent literature on the relationship between climate risks and finance. It examines institutional investors' perceptions of climate risks and reports findings on the impact of climate risks on the value of real estate, debt and equity.

Climate risks, whether physical risks or transition risks, represent an increasingly important issue for companies, bankers and institutional investors. This article provides a review of the recent literature on the relationship between climate risks and finance. It examines institutional investors' perceptions of climate risks and reports findings on the impact of climate risks on the value of real estate, debt and equity.

This thesis analyzes the financing contracts used by venture capital funds, the waves of investments made and the use of bridge loans. The first chapter presents a theoretical model of financing contracts. This model proposes a contract that offers more profit to the entrepreneur in order to create a less conflictive relationship, although the entrepreneur initially has more bargaining power. Most equity funds claim to make the initial investment in a company based on the analysis of the founding team and the size of the company's target market. By analyzing venture capital fund investments, we have been able to highlight the existence of waves of venture capital fund investments, similar to waves of mergers and acquisitions. The second chapter of this thesis analyzes the effects caused by these investment waves and the impact of the syndicate network on the success rate of the investments. We show that the investment syndicate network impacts the investment success rate. In the last chapter of this thesis, an analysis of the use of bridging loans was conducted due to its relatively high use by venture capital funds. The analysis showed that companies financed by bridging loans have low success rates (0.7%) and that venture capital funds using this type of instrument have a lower success rate in raising a new venture capital fund.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face financing constraints that limit their growth strategies and financial management flexibility. This thesis contributes to a better understanding of SMEs' growth strategies and their management and financing of working capital requirements (WCR). The first part focuses on the growth strategies implemented by SMEs. The first chapter presents the main characteristics of external growth operations of SMEs and the articulation of these operations with the IPO. The second chapter studies the impact of external growth operations on performance. The third chapter proposes an exploratory study of the formation of corporate groups by SMEs. In the second part, the characteristics of the management and financing of the working capital of SMEs are analyzed. The fourth chapter shows that the performance of SMEs is negatively affected by underinvestment in working capital through opportunity costs and that this effect is stronger than for larger firms. The fifth chapter shows that newly listed SMEs offer longer payment terms to their customers but that other aspects of working capital management are not modified by the listing. The sixth chapter shows the financial flexibility offered by being part of a corporate group in terms of WCR management.

No summary available.

We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third followingthe introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.

Unions provide employee representation and thus enable collective action by employees. This manuscript discusses the effect of unions on firm performance and the responses that firms implement in response to union activity. The first chapter shows that the effect of unions on firm performance depends on the number and type of unions present in firms. Compared to a single union, the presence of several unions decreases firm profitability because the increase in wages is greater than the increase in labor productivity. The second chapter discusses the link between earnings smoothing and union presence. Earnings smoothing reduces the wage premium associated with union presence, by reducing the perceived risk to employment sustainability. Finally, the third chapter shows that the practice of gender pay differentials, as a method of individualizing pay, limits the influence of unions within firms.

This thesis consists of three chapters and examines the organizational structure of the firm at a different stage of its life cycle: start-up, growth, and large firm. The first chapter examines the underlying reasons for differences in funding between male and female entrepreneurs in the context of the venture capital industry. This chapter highlights the effects of gender stereotypes that hinder the growth of start-ups founded by gender minority entrepreneurs. In this context, the human capital of entrepreneurs mitigates investor stereotypes to some extent. The second chapter describes the conditions under which firms choose to grow by buying an existing firm rather than expanding by leveraging human capital resources. The third chapter focuses on large groups of firms. This chapter shows that investors are not always aware of the limitations of the corporate structure and miss predictive information revealed at another level of the group.

No summary available.

This thesis explores the implications for corporate finance of the growing importance of intangible capital in determining the competitive advantage of firms. In the first chapter (with C. Lenoir, CREST), we show that insufficient access to short-term financing is an obstacle to the development of firms' customer base. In the second chapter (with T. Libert of PSE and C. Hurlin of Université d'Orléans), we analyze the effects of under-diversification of banks' borrower bases. Our results indicate that concentration exposes lenders to the idiosyncratic risk of their borrowers and that it leads to a greater synchronization of credit flows between banks. In the third chapter (with V. Lyonnet of OSU and C. Hebert of Paris Dauphine/Tilburg U.), we show that firms use M&A to acquire specialized human capital when external hiring is too costly.

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We use new data measuring forward-looking physical climate risk at the firm level to examine the impact of climate risk on capital structure. We find that greater climate risk leads to lower leverage in the post-2015 period, i.e., after the Paris Agreement. Our results hold after controlling for firm characteristics known to determine leverage, including credit ratings and several fixed effects. Our evidence shows that the reduction in debt related to climate risk is shared between a demand effect (the firm’s optimal leverage decreases) and a supply effect (lenders, especially bankers, reduce their lending to companies with the greatest risk).

The 2014 passage of the Florange Act in France changed an opt-in provision for loyalty shares (allocating a second voting right for shares held at least two years) to an opt-out provision with shareholder approval. We find that before 2014, loyalty shares were popular among small family firms. Following the Act, firms with a one share – one vote structure that announced they would opt out of the law incurred a negative market reaction, suggesting that shareholders have a positive perception of loyalty shares. It appears that by encouraging costly monitoring by long-term shareholders, loyalty shares can benefit all shareholders.

No summary available.

Family firms represent a large proportion of the world's listed companies. The governance mechanisms of family firms take into account the specificities of their agency conflicts. For example, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers can be mitigated when the managers are themselves family members. The costs of agency conflicts between the majority family block and minority shareholders, linked to potential private profit taking, can be offset by more effective control of managers, while a specific agency conflict linked to the relations between the family as a whole and those who represent it in the organization of the shareholder block can emerge. The governance mechanisms put in place seem to be effective, since family firms appear to perform better than non-family firms. But they are also less diversified, less innovative and more sensitive to the social climate in the firm. Their financial decisions reflect the concern of their family shareholders to preserve their control, which involves in particular the establishment of long-term relationships with the firm's other stakeholders. This article provides a synthesis of research findings on these topics.

The first chapter shows that refinancing risk affects the market performance of a product. I find that firms with a large fraction of short-term debt (i.e., debt maturing within three years) exhibit significantly lower sales and market share growth.The second chapter studies how horizontal mergers and acquisitions affect stock market valuations. Horizontal M&A announcements induce an adverse average industry revaluation in a large sample of public and private M&A deals. Average competitor revaluation is a strong predictor of future industry returns. Competitor revaluation also depends on the public status of the target (positive when the target is public and negative when the target is private) and varies systematically with indicators of overall market mispricing. Our findings are consistent with the idea that investors incorporate new information about industry-wide mispricing into the valuation of non-merged firms.The third chapter studies how labor laws affect payment policy. This paper shows that labor's bargaining power affects both capital structure decisions and payments. I find that the passage of the wrongful termination law leads to an increase in dividends per share, dividend yield, and dividend payout ratio, while accounting leverage decreases.

This doctoral dissertation includes three essays related to the gender of financial analysts. The empirical results of the first study attest to an underrepresentation of female analysts and confirm that national culture has a significant impact on the representation of female financial analysts in the European countries studied. The second study shows that male analysts are more likely to make innovative recommendations than female analysts, due to a higher confidence in their judgment. Finally, the findings of the third study show that innovative recommendations trigger stronger reactions from investors, but there are no gender differences in market reactions to these innovative recommendations. The empirical findings of this dissertation complement the literature on financial analysts, and specifically on the impact of gender in financial decision making.

Recent years have witnessed a lack of dynamism in the stock markets, which has led a growing number of investors to turn to private markets, particularly private equity. This manuscript addresses issues that characterize the changes in private equity today: a search for relative liquidity, a quest for higher returns in new markets, and the stability of human resources, which remain an important vector of communication when raising funds from investors.The first essay of this thesis examines the impact of the IPO of private equity vehicles on their performance and shows that this search for liquidity leads to a significant decrease in realized performance. The second essay discusses the performance of private equity in emerging markets and shows that the success of these investments is related to the geographical distance and cultural proximity between private equity firms and the companies financed.Finally, the last essay of this thesis examines the importance of human capital for private equity firms and shows that managerial mobility deteriorates realized performance.

No summary available.

This manuscript presents three separate chapters covering topics related to the functioning and role of boards of directors. The first chapter investigates the effect of recognition of director expertise on firm growth opportunities, using prestige awards earned by directors. The results indicate that the presence of award-winning directors on boards leads to better investment opportunities. The second chapter analyzes the impact of the quota of women on boards of directors in France on the stock market value of companies. Prior to the quota, investors reacted positively to announcements of female board members, particularly for male-dominated boards. The announcement of the enactment of the law on January 27, 2011 is seen as good news on the stock market, leading investors to anticipate the recruitment of women resulting from the quota. The third chapter discusses the impact of the quota on the labor market for directors. The results indicate that the quota has changed board recruitment practices and, as a result, has improved the stability of company-director matches.

No summary available.

This thesis studies corporate bond financing. The results highlight the role of the legal environment and governance. The first chapter demonstrates the role of creditor protection and information in the bond market. It identifies a non-homogeneous impact across firms. The second chapter analyzes the impact of a bond issue on the value of a firm using a meta-analysis. It highlights the factors explaining results that have been divergent in the literature until now. The third chapter focuses on the Chinese corporate bond market and highlights the role of state and managerial ownership on the value created by a bond issue. Finally, the fourth chapter isolates a religious bias of professional investors, and contributes to the behavioral literature on firm value.

We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third followingthe introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.

No summary available.

We examine how investor attention changes when a firm adopts a modern news dissemination technology. We find that after continental European firms begin using an English-language electronic wire service to disseminate company news, they exhibit a stronger initial reaction to earnings surprises, a lower post earnings announcement stock price drift, and an increase in abnormal trading volume near earnings announcements, compared with when they disseminated their news in non-electronic format and in a continental European language. Our results hold for a sub-sample of firms for which the decision to use a wire service was likely exogenous. The effect of wire services on investor attention is due to the format of news (electronic and English-language), not to the increased speed of news transmission.

We provide evidence on optional stock dividends, a mechanism that allows shareholders to choose between cash dividends and the equivalent number of new shares in lieu of cash. We find that, in contrast to dividend cuts, shareholders do not view this option as bad news. When firms offer optional stock dividend in lieu of cash dividends, the market does not react negatively. Facing the choice between cash and stock dividend, shareholders choose 55% of the total dividend in the form of stock dividend. Our findings suggest that firms that are more committed to paying dividends are more likely to offer optional stock dividends to their shareholders.

This thesis deals with the influence of shareholders' investment horizon on firms' decisions and performance. It is composed of four articles. The first article reviews the literature and identifies gaps that the other three empirical articles seek to fill. The second article is devoted to the effect of the shareholders' investment horizon on employee satisfaction. Employee satisfaction is an intangible asset that, although it creates value in the long run, is poorly valued by the market in the short run. For this reason, long-term and short-term investors may not have the same interest in the companies they invest in satisfying their employees. The paper documents a positive effect of long-term investors on employee satisfaction and establishes causality in different ways. This result indicates that ownership structure is an important determinant of the implementation of CSR policies that create long-term value. The third paper studies the impact of shareholders' investment horizon on banks' performance during the crisis. The results of the empirical analysis show that a greater presence of short-term shareholders is associated with a greater fall in share price during the crisis. This association is partly explained by the greater risk-taking of banks with a greater presence of short-term shareholders before the crisis. It is also explained by the behavior of short-term shareholders during the crisis. The latter sold their shares massively, generating greater pressure to sell bank shares by all institutional investors. These results have implications for bank capital regulation, suggesting that the protective effect of bank capital varies with the investment horizon of the holders of the capital. The last paper focuses on the disciplinary effect of long-term investors. It shows that the disciplinary effect of long-term investors on the overinvestment of a firm depends on the length of time these investors have actually held the firm's shares. The results of the empirical analysis support the idea that, in order to build a shareholder base that generates more value, attracting long-term investors is not enough, firms should also induce their shareholders to hold their shares longer.

Because of biases that corporate executives suffer when making acquisition decisions, M&A has a long history of not generating positive returns for buyers. Through three trials, our research explores the impact of recent changes in the economic and social environment, including 1) the deployment of IFRS, 2) the development of board committees, and 3) the publication of the NRE Law, on the M&A performance of acquirers in France. Analyzing the abnormal returns generated at the time an acquisition is made, we find that M&A performance has not improved, mainly because the main changes that have occurred have left significant discretion to management but also because the adoption of new market practices have been incorporated by investors in their evaluation of acquisition results. We also find that CSR strategies have a negative impact. However, we find that the establishment of board committees and the implementation of the NRE Act, which may have led to increased transparency of information, have had a positive impact.

In an economic environment that is increasingly competitive, tense and uncertain, companies must demonstrate adaptability, precaution and anticipation. This manuscript addresses several themes related to this observation, which closely touch the notion of cash management. The first essay of this thesis shows that the distribution of a stock dividend allows firms to temporarily reduce the remuneration of their shareholders, without being sanctioned by the latter. This mechanism allows firms to maintain liquidity and flexibility in times of economic contraction. The second essay deals with the link between customer risk and liquidity management policy. Increased customer risk seems to push firms to hold more cash and to use credit lines less. Finally, the third essay justifies the interest of establishing long-term customer-supplier relationships. These partnerships appear to be a source of increased efficiency and profitability in the operational cycle of companies.

This paper provides new evidence on dividend policy by studying optional stock dividends, a mechanism that allows firms to cut cash payouts without a negative market reaction. We find that highly leveraged firms with limited cash holdings and large institutional ownership are more likely to offer optional stock dividends to their hareholders. These firms are the most committed to paying dividends, and optional stock dividends provide them with an opportunity for a stealth cut in dividends during economic downturns. Shareholders overwhelmingly approve optional stock dividends at general meetings with the majority favoring stock dividends over cash dividends. Further, in contrast to dividend cuts, shareholders do not view optional stock dividends as bad news. Our results support the monitoring explanation of optional stock dividends and show that shareholders value a firm’s ability and willingness to pay dividends, even if the final cash payout is reduced.

The remuneration of top executives has increased substantially in recent decades and has contributed to the growth of inequality through high incomes. Two typologies for controlling shareholders are proposed to analyze the evolution and practices of (P-)CEO compensation in large French listed groups. The first typology is based on the identity of the shareholder and differentiates between active shareholders committed to the firm's strategy and passive or diversified shareholders. Among the latter are shareholders whose strategy is essentially financial. Remuneration is higher and more sensitive to short-term performance for the latter. The second typology is based on two criteria: the degree of control (shareholding) and the length of control (years of control). Using a threshold panel data model (PTR model), executive compensation policies allow us to differentiate four regimes in terms of degree and two in terms of length of control. This typology differentiates between dispersed, influential, dominant and majority control, on the one hand, and the effects of recent and long-term controlling shareholders, on the other. Finally, the evolution of remuneration is studied on the basis of these two typologies and over a period of 12 years. Beyond factors linked to the functioning of the "executive market", the typologies highlight a phenomenon of catch-up and contagion following the transparency of remuneration since 2001, and a strong increase in bonuses due to the effect of the increase in market capitalization and the accompanying changes in shareholding.

This paper provides new evidence on dividend policy by studying optional stock dividends, a mechanism that allows firms to cut cash payouts without a negative market reaction. We find that highly leveraged firms with limited cash holdings and large institutional ownership are more likely to offer optional stock dividends to their hareholders. These firms are the most committed to paying dividends, and optional stock dividends provide them with an opportunity for a stealth cut in dividends during economic downturns. Shareholders overwhelmingly approve optional stock dividends at general meetings with the majority favoring stock dividends over cash dividends. Further, in contrast to dividend cuts, shareholders do not view optional stock dividends as bad news. Our results support the monitoring explanation of optional stock dividends and show that shareholders value a firm’s ability and willingness to pay dividends, even if the final cash payout is reduced.

No summary available.

In this paper, we attempt to bridge the gap between two strands of the literature. First, we conduct an in-depth investigation of the relationship between liquidity and market decline in an emerging country (Brazil). In our research, we follow the methodology used by Hameed et al (2010) and Adrian et al (2011). In the first part of the study, using the liquidity measure estimation variable proposed by Corwin and Schultz (2012), we perform a time series analysis to estimate the effect of market returns on individual returns, and the impact of the crisis on liquidity. We further extend our analysis to funding liquidity, as measured by the spread of the remuneration between commercial papers and the central bank's base rate, to estimate the effect of the market decline when speculators face a funding constraint. In the second part of our research, we focus on liquidity factors. We estimate the effect of market liquidity on idiosyncratic liquidity, and examine whether this effect is amplified in the context of a significant market decline. In the third part of the thesis, we divide stocks into three equally weighted portfolios based on differential corporate governance practices. We perform the analysis mentioned above to estimate whether the liquidity of firms with different corporate governance practices react differently in the presence of significant market declines and liquidity spirals.

The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the literature on board structure and effectiveness. It is structured around four chapters. The first chapter is a review of the literature, while the other three focus on separate research questions. The first study presented in the second chapter of this thesis aims to investigate the determinants of the size of the BoD, the independence of its members, and the duality of the functions of management and chair of the BoD. The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows: first, our results are based on the analysis of one of the largest samples used in this field, with approximately 16,000 observations (firm-years) for nearly 2,300 U.S. firms observed from 1997 to 2010. Moreover, from a methodological point of view, a battery of statistical tests was carried out in order to verify the robustness of our results, in particular tests taking into account the heterogeneity and simultaneity biases. Finally, this study is probably the first to demonstrate that the passage of the SOX law has limited the ability of managers to influence the composition of the board. The second study focuses on analyzing the two main functions of the board, which are to advise the CEO and to monitor the CEO's activities. Thus, understanding the ability of the board of directors to fulfill these functions is a fundamental question that we propose to explore. This study adds to the emerging literature on the advisory function of the board of directors by providing new evidence on the importance of this function in the creation of corporate value. These results also shed light on the potential conflict between the two main functions of the AC. Finally, this study is in line with the current of thought that seeks to evaluate the impact of corporate characteristics on the effectiveness of corporate governance structures. The main objective of the third study presented in the last chapter of this thesis is to determine whether and how directors' stock-based compensation can affect future acquisition decisions. The results of this study shed new light on director compensation. This study highlights the importance of stock and option incentive compensation practices for board members. Although many studies have been conducted to analyze the relationship between director incentives and firm performance, our study is one of the first to explore the mechanisms through which these incentives can influence firm value.

This thesis is composed of three separate chapters. The first chapter shows that managers overreact to risks that come to their attention. After a hurricane, the shock to perceived liquidity risk produced by the disaster leads firms in the vicinity of the disaster area to temporarily increase their cash holdings while the actual risk has not changed. The second chapter shows that managers strategically influence investors' attention to earnings announcements by warning them of the date of the event at a later or later time. This strategy allows them to smooth the impact of bad results on their stock price over time. The third chapter studies the effect of league tables in M&A activities. League tables rank investment banks. A bank's league table ranking predicts its ability to generate new business in the future, which gives banks an incentive to manipulate their rankings.

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards. firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. There is enhanced sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater monitoring. Our results are broadly consistent with the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model and suggest there are gains from allowing freedom of contract about board structure.

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards. firms with a potential for private benefits extraction tend to adopt two-tier boards. There is enhanced sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance at firms with two-tier boards, indicating greater monitoring. Our results are broadly consistent with the Adams and Ferreira (2007) model and suggest there are gains from allowing freedom of contract about board structure.

No summary available.

This paper examines the impact of market liquidity on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) characteristics in France. We find that, besides blockholders' takeup, liquidity is an important determinant of SEO flotation method choice. We document higher direct equity offering flotation costs, but also improved stock market liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. After controlling for endogeneity in the choice of SEO flotation method, we find that pure public offerings and standby rights are comparable in terms of direct costs and liquidity improvement. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public offerings despite apparently higher costs.

Investors do not always take advantage of all available information when making decisions, due to both information overload and limited cognitive abilities. The first test of this thesis shows that companies take advantage of investors' inattention by communicating more or less in advance the date on which earnings announcements will take place. Positive results are notified well in advance, while disappointing results are subject to a shorter notification period. The second essay deals with the international visibility of companies and investigates the impact of communicating in English via wide distribution channels. This wider dissemination increases investor attention and the information contained in earnings announcements is more quickly incorporated into the stock price. The third essay discusses the consequences of increased corporate visibility on investment policy. Broader dissemination of financial information improves both the informational environment of companies and the effectiveness of their investment policy.

This paper examines the impact of market liquidity on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) characteristics in France. We find that, besides blockholders’ takeup, liquidity is an important determinant of SEO flotation method choice. We document higher direct equity offering flotation costs, but also improved stock market liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. After controlling for endogeneity in the choice of SEO flotation method, we find that pure public offerings and standby rights are comparable in terms of direct costs and liquidity improvement. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public offerings despite apparently higher costs.

Say on Pay, introduced in France by the 2013 AFEP-MEDEF governance code, allows shareholders to express their views on executive compensation through a vote at the general meeting. This article provides a review of studies conducted in countries where Say on Pay has been in force for several years. Shareholders rarely contest the remuneration submitted to them, but when they do, the sensitivity of remuneration to the company's performance increases. The most tangible effects of Say on Pay are the increase in the influence of consulting firms in voting and the improvement of the dialogue between shareholders, directors and executives upstream.

This thesis explores the link between transaction costs, asymmetric information and equity issuance. First, we analyze the impact of stock liquidity on the characteristics of issues and show that it is an important determinant of the choice of the issuance procedure. We observe that the pure public issue and the issue with guaranteed rights are the most expensive procedures but also the ones that improve liquidity the most. Second, we analyze the strategic behavior of the guarantor bank and the shareholders during the subscription period of a rights issue and show that they apply selling pressure on the secondary market of the securities generating negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, we observe that rights trade at a price below their intrinsic value. Finally, we document the presence of informed agents before a rights issue who reflect their information in their orders, thus contributing to the informational efficiency of prices. These results provide a better understanding of informed trading around capital increases and the choice of issuance terms.

The development of forms of employee participation in the firm since the post-war period has raised new issues in terms of employee behavior. Whether they are shareholders, directors or simple employees without capital and voting rights, employees are no longer observed as a factor of production as in the classical microeconomic literature but, from now on, as a real stakeholder in the firm, acting on both the performance and the governance of firms. In terms of employee��shareholding, we show that its importance encourages firms to maintain stock prices at lower levels. Moreover, we observe that capital increases reserved for employees are essentially carried out by firms familiar with this type of operation and that the secure nature of the offer is a source of greater subscription of shares. Regarding employee representation on boards of directors and supervisory boards, our results show that directors elected by employees significantly reduce the amounts paid to shareholders in the form of dividends and share buybacks, and sit on larger boards that require more meetings. Directors representing employee shareholders, on the other hand, have a positive influence on operational and stock market performance. Finally, we show that labor relations are more consensual in family firms, which translates into less frequent, less intense and shorter conflicts.

The ownership structure is an integral part of corporate governance mechanisms. Two particular dimensions are studied in this work: shareholders' agreements that formalize the presence of a controlling coalition and the gap between voting rights and capital rights. The empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of French listed firms. We show that the existence of a pact offsets the negative effect on performance of an unequal distribution of voting rights among large shareholders. Pacts thus appear to be effective coordination mechanisms. We then analyze the relationship between shareholder pacts and the takeover market. We find that firms with a pact are no less likely to be subject to a change of control, and that a change of control is achieved at a higher premium. This result contradicts the idea that shareholder pacts slow down ownership transfers. In a final study on acquisition policy, we find that the difference between the voting rights and the equity rights of the largest shareholder of the acquiring company negatively affects the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement. Corporate acquisitions thus appear to be a channel for private profit extraction at the expense of minority shareholders.

This work aims to determine, in the context of companies going public, the factors that explain the presence of contractual commitments by the main shareholders on the one hand and their impact on the value of the firm on the other. The term "contractual commitment" refers to two mechanisms put in place at the time of the IPO: commitments to retain shares by managers and shareholders' agreements. Our study focuses on a sample of 292 companies listed between 1996 and 2000 on the Nouveau Marché and the Second Marché of the Paris Stock Exchange. Our results show that the presence and duration of executive shareholding commitments serve to signal the value of the firm when information asymmetry is high but also to compensate for some inefficiencies in the firm's governance system. We also observe a negative impact on the value of the firm of management retention commitments, whereas those concerning venture capital firms have a positive impact. Regarding shareholders' agreements, our work shows that their implementation is more likely when managers anticipate a future sale of the firm. They also have a positive influence on the value of the firm as long as they do not protect the signatories from a hostile takeover. In the latter case, the effect on the value of the firm is negative. Finally, we show that there is a negative reaction of the stock market price around the day of the expiration of the retention agreements.

No summary available.

This thesis investigates several aspects of cash holding in French and European companies. First, this research shows that holding cash allows growth firms to finance investment opportunities. While it allows mature companies to distribute dividends to their shareholders and increase resources under the control of management. Its impact on the market value of firms is positive for growth firms and negative for mature firms. Second, this thesis explains the importance of the cash position of American firms compared to European firms by highlighting the role of the differentiated evolution of the main determinants of the cash position as well as the existence of differences in sectoral composition in these two markets. Finally, this work shows that the reason for holding cash in French firms depends on their mode of governance. Moreover, the quality of governance is strongly correlated with the degree of firms' financial constraints. The largest firms, which are the least financially constrained and therefore hold low levels of cash, implement anti-takeover mechanisms leading to a low measure of governance quality.

The objective of this thesis is to answer three research questions, which have been little explored in the literature. The goal of our first attempt is to control for the existence of acquisition timing. Our goal is to identify the conditions and motivations that promote timing. Our second essay focuses on the behavior of managers who engage their firms in acquisitions. Using data on insider transactions of Canadian acquirers, we empirically test whether acquisitions are the result of rational decisions or over-optimism on the part of managers. In our third essay, we focus on cross-border acquisitions. We examine the role of differences in the legal environments between the acquirer and the target in the decision to acquire abroad and the performance generated by these acquisitions.

This thesis focuses on the study of voluntary earnings announcements by listed companies. The empirical studies carried out shed light on the factors explaining the use of this type of communication and their effects on the French stock market. The practice of voluntary disclosure is justified by the significant participation of foreign institutional investors. These investors offer a guarantee of protection for minority shareholders. Signaling considerations have also been put forward. Voluntary earnings releases tend to reduce the uncertainty of financial analysts and investors. They also improve the liquidity of securities and reduce information asymmetry. Finally, it appears that managers use different earnings release strategies depending on the objectives pursued by the company.

Empirical research and current events attest to the insufficiency and bias of the information available to investors at the time of an IPO. Yet, classical financial theory emphasizes the expected gains from quality information. This thesis attempts to explain and overcome this paradox. We analyze the information offer of the IPO company's manager and financial analysts. Our results show that creditors and investors do not seem to provide sufficient incentives for the manager to publish accurate forecasts. Analysts seem to adjust their information offer to the business interests of their employer. The company's signals do not adequately reveal its true value to the market. Finally, the legitimacy and limited means of the regulator explain its difficulties in improving the information environment of IPOs.

The analysis of financing policy within group structures is addressed through the study of capital increases and intra-group debt. A single dećisional center defines a global financial strategy, which guides the financing and investment choices of member companies. During a share issue, when two entities are listed, the choice of the issuing firm provides group managers with arbitrage opportunities in the timing of the transaction. Intra-group financial exchanges and the allocation of funds between subsidiaries condition the emergence of an internal capital market. The use of intra-group debt reduces the degree of financial constraints and increases the external debt capacity of subsidiaries. However, the transfer of funds favors the less profitable subsidiaries, which receive more resources and invest more than the efficient entities. The inefficiency of internal capital markets results from the existence of several hierarchical levels (subsidiaries and parent company), and two classes of shareholders (majority and minority).

In this research, we question the reasons for increasing access to the financial market in a group structure in Europe. Also, we seek to study the interest and the consequences of an IPO of a subsidiary of a European group. We are also interested in describing the issuance of tracking shares by the Alcatel group, since it constitutes a particular placement of an activity on the market. With reference to the contractual theory of organizations and the theory of information economics, we assume that the listing of a subsidiary would be prompted by a desire to signal the undervaluation of the parent company by offering undervalued shares, to reduce the asymmetry of information about the group's activities, to exploit a window of opportunity and/or to evade financial constraints...

The research proposes to identify the determinants of the assessment of the risk of default of European local governments in four countries: Spain, France, Italy, and Sweden. The first part presents a comparison of local systems in these countries in order to assess the risk arising from the regulatory environment. Then, after studying local accounting information in Europe, a common risk analysis vector composed of 19 accounting and socio-economic variables is constructed on the basis of published information. The second part addresses the discretionary risk generated by local financing choices from the perspective of financial theory. We study the sharing of risk between the local government group and the lenders when financing an investment project through a bond issue. The implementation of an option analysis model of local default leads us to formulate proposals on the main determinants of the investors' risk assessment. The third part tests these propositions on a sample of 55 European local governments over the period 1995-1998. A first study focuses on the determinants of rating. A second study identifies the factors that influence the risk premium of 36 Franco-Spanish bonds in 1998. A third study, based on interviews, focuses on the enhanced bonds issued by the city of Marseille. The local socio-economic environment seems to have an important weight in the risk assessment, along with the level of indebtedness and the structure of current revenues. Finally, it appears that investors rely as much on the accounts as on the rating to assess the default risk premium.

France is characterized by a particularly active market for public offers. This market is essentially composed of offers to strengthen control and to close the capital. This specificity is not neutral in terms of information. This has led us to question the effects of information asymmetry on the bidding process and the latitude of the bidder to manage it. The first part of this research is devoted to two reviews of the literature and to the statement of our hypotheses. The first reviews the literature on the motivations of offers and highlights their plurality. The second part focuses on the modelings that have emphasized the informational variable as well as the pre-bid buying strategies.

In recent years, derivative products have grown exponentially. The losses realized on these markets and the risks of these products have raised the concern of regulatory bodies. The organization of these products requires the development of a risk management, management control. Risk control. After a terminological approach, we will present the characteristics of these processes. In particular, we will detail the management of market and counterparty risk. Our empirical study focuses on the risk management of derivative products. First, an analysis of the annual reports of 97 banks (American, French, German) from 1994 to 1996 aims to highlight the relevance of the information on exposure, organization, control and risk management. Secondly, the analysis of the responses of 35 banks to a 165-question questionnaire presents the solutions adopted by the banks. This study highlights national differences and recommendations in derivatives risk management.

Our research aims to show that the theory of financial intermediation can provide a new explanation for the debt behavior of local governments, especially in their trade-off between bank debt and mandatory debt. In line with certain models derived from the theory of financial intermediation, the model presented here shows that, because of the high issuance costs, only local governments with large borrowing needs can finance themselves on the market. On the other hand, local governments choose their source of debt by comparing the expected gain from renegotiation and the additional cost of bank financing. The hypotheses of the model were tested, partly successfully, on a sample of 94 local authorities over the period 1985-1995. The results show that the size effect and the quality of the local authority are determining factors in the trade-off between the two types of debt.