LAMIRAUD Karine

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Affiliations
  • 2012 - 2021
    Théorie économique, modélisation et applications
  • 2012 - 2021
    Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales de Cergy
  • 2014 - 2015
    Université de Cergy Pontoise
  • 2003 - 2004
    University of Lausanne
  • 2003 - 2004
    Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales
  • 2021
  • 2020
  • 2018
  • 2017
  • 2016
  • 2015
  • 2014
  • 2013
  • 2004
  • Balance Billing as an Adherence to Treatment Signalling Device.

    Damien BESANCENOT, Karine LAMIRAUD, Radu VRANCEANU
    2021
    In some countries, including France, patients can choose between consulting a physician working in the regulated sector where, in general, fees are fully covered by health insurance (whether public, private or mixed), or a physician working in the unregulated sector, where a balance billing scheme operates. In the latter, fees might not be fully covered by health insurance, and patients must make out-of-pocket payments. The paper analyses the signalling properties of this mechanism in a context where patients are heterogenous with respect to their propensity to adhere to the prescribed treatment. The model reveals that a small extra fee allows to obtain a separating equilibrium in which only patients with a high propensity to adhere to the treatment will opt for the unregulated sector and benefit of a higher care effort on behalf of their physician. We also analyse the other equilibria of the game and comment on their welfare properties.
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